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Abstract
In an open-economy R&D-based growth model with two intermediate production
sectors, we find that strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) has a positive
effect on innovation in the sector that uses domestic inputs but both positive and
negative effects on innovation in the sector that uses foreign inputs. We test these
results using an empirical analysis of matching samples that combine Chinese provincial
IPR data with industrial enterprises database and customs database.
JEL classification: F43, O31, O34
Keywords : Intellectual property rights; imports; knowledge spillovers; innovation
Chu: China Center for Economic Studies, School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
Email: angusccc@gmail.com.
Shen: Institute of World Economy, School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Email:
guobingshen@fudan.edu.cn.
Zhang: Institute of World Economy, School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Email:
xzhang14@fudan.edu.cn.
Shen acknowledges financial support from Chinese National Social Science Foundation Key Project (grant
15AZD058) and Chinese Ministry of Education Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social
Sciences at Universities “The Study on Innovation Protection and Chinese Firms’ Promotion of Foreign
Trade Competitiveness under the Industry Production Network”.
1 Introduction
This study provides both a theoretical analysis and an empirical investigation on the effects
of intellectual property rights (IPR). We develop an open-economy R&D-based growth model
with two intermediate production sectors that use domestic and foreign inputs respectively.
We use the model to explore the effects of IPR on knowledge spillovers and innovation. In
the sector that uses domestic inputs, strengthening IPR has a positive effect on innovation.
However, in the sector that uses foreign inputs, strengthening IPR has both positive and
negative effects, where the latter is due to IPR suppressing knowledge spillovers from imports.
We test these results using an empirical analysis of matching samples that combine
Chinese provincial IPR data with industrial enterprises database and customs database.
Our regression results confirm that IPR indeed has the usual positive effect on innovation
but also a negative interactive effect on innovation via imports, which is consistent with the
above-mentioned suppression effect of IPR on knowledge spillovers from imports. However,
importing firms still have better innovation performance than non-importing firms, which
is consistent with our theoretical model. Finally, strengthening IPR first enlarges and then
reduces the difference in the innovation performance between importing and non-importing
firms, which is also consistent with our theoretical model.
This study relates to the theoretical literature on innovation and economic growth. The
seminal study in this literature is Romer (1990). Subsequent studies in this literature use
variants of the R&D-based growth model to explore the effects of IPR; see for example Lai
(1998), Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Grossman and Lai (2004), Chu (2009), Furukawa
(2010), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Yang (2013), Cozzi and Galli (2014), Zeng et al.
(2014), Lin (2015), Huang et al. (2017) and Saito (2017). The current study differs from
these studies by exploring a novel channel through which strengthening IPR causes a negative
effect on innovation by suppressing knowledge spillovers from imports.
The study also relates to the empirical literature on the determinants of innovation. For
example, Goldberg et al. (2010) use firm-level data to show that imported intermediate
inputs increase product innovation in India. Chen and Puttitanun (2005) use country-level
data to show that strengthening IPR increases innovation. Recent studies explore channels
through which IPR affects innovation. For example, Ang et al. (2014) show that IPR
stimulates innovation by improving firms’ external financing ability. Naghavi and Strozzi
(2015) find that IPR interacts with international migration to encourage domestic innovation
by creating an environment that transmits knowledge acquired by emigrants. The current
study complements these studies by exploring the effects of IPR on innovation via imports.
2 Theoretical model
We extend the small-open-economy growth model1 in Grossman and Helpman (1991) into
multiple production and R&D sectors. Also, we assume that one sector uses domestic inputs
to produce differentiated products, whereas the other sector uses foreign inputs.
1A small open economy may not fully capture China. However, our small-open-economy model simply
assumes the price of imported inputs to be exogenous. Given that this price does not affect the equilibrium
allocation of R&D labor, we consider our model as a useful approximation to the analysis of IPR in China.
1
2.1 Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(lnCy,t + γ lnCz,t)dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate. Cy,t is the consumption of a domestic final good chosen as
the numeraire. Cz,t is the consumption of an imported final good from abroad. Its price pz,t
is exogenous. The asset-accumulation equation is
A˙t = rtAt + wtl − Cy,t − pz,tCz,t. (2)
At is the amount of assets. rt is the interest rate. l denotes labor. wt is the wage rate. From
standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions are
C˙y,t
Cy,t
= rt − ρ, (3)
Cz,t = γCy,t/pz,t. (4)
2.2 Domestic final good
Domestic final good2 is produced by the following aggregator:3
Yt = (X
d
t )
0.5(Xft )
0.5, (5)
where Xdt is an intermediate good that uses domestic inputs and X
f
t is an intermediate
good that uses foreign inputs. Profit maximization yields the following conditional demand
functions for Xdt and X
f
t :
Xdt =
Yt
2P dt
, (6)
Xft =
Yt
2P ft
, (7)
where P dt and P
f
t are the prices of X
d
t and X
f
t respectively.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Intermediate good i ∈ {d, f} is produced by
X it = (L
i
t)
1−α
∫ nit
0
[xit(ω)]
αdω, (8)
2It can be consumed by the household, used to produce intermediate inputs or exported abroad.
3Our results are robust to Yt = (X
d
t )
θ(Xft )
1−θ; derivations available upon request. We focus on θ = 0.5
for simplicity.
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where Lit denotes domestic production labor and x
i
t(ω) denotes differentiated inputs. Profit
maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for Lit and x
i
t(ω):
wt = (1− α)P itX it/Lit, (9)
pit(ω) = αP
i
t (L
i
t)
1−α[xit(ω)]
α−1, (10)
where pit(ω) is the price of x
i
t(ω).
2.4 Domestic differentiated inputs
Domestic differentiated inputs xdt (ω) are produced by domestic final good with an one-to-one
technology. The profit function is
pidt (ω) = p
d
t (ω)x
d
t (ω)− xdt (ω) = αP dt (Ldt )1−α[xdt (ω)]α − xdt (ω). (11)
The monopolistic price is pdt (ω) = min{µ, 1/α}, where µ < 1/α. As is common in the
literature,4 due to incomplete patent protection µ, the monopolist cannot charge too high a
price; otherwise, an imitator will produce xdt (ω). The amount of profit for ω ∈ [0, ndt ] is
pidt (ω) = (µ− 1)xdt (ω) =
µ− 1
µ
αP dt X
d
t
ndt
=
µ− 1
µ
αYt
2ndt
≡ pidt , (12)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (8), (10) and pdt (ω) = µ. The balanced-growth
value of an invention is
vdt (ω) =
pidt (ω)
r − gdpi
=
µ− 1
µ
αYt
2ndt
1
ρ+ gdn
≡ vdt , (13)
where gdpi and g
d
n are the steady-state growth rates of pi
d
t and n
d
t respectively.
2.5 Foreign differentiated inputs
Foreign differentiated inputs xft (ω) are produced by foreign final good with an one-to-one
technology. The profit function is
pift (ω) = p
f
t (ω)x
f
t (ω)− pz,txft (ω) = αP ft (Lft )1−α[xft (ω)]α − pz,txft (ω). (14)
The monopolistic price is pft (ω) = min {µ, 1/α} pz,t, where µ < 1/α. Once gain, due to
incomplete patent protection µ, the monopolist cannot charge too high a price; otherwise,
an imitator will produce xft (ω). The amount of profit for ω ∈ [0, nft ] is
pift (ω) = (µ− 1)pz,txft (ω) =
µ− 1
µ
αP ft X
f
t
nft
=
µ− 1
µ
αYt
2nft
≡ pift , (15)
where the second equality uses symmetry in (8), (10) and pft (ω) = µpz,t. The balanced-
growth value of an invention is
vft (ω) =
pift (ω)
r − gfpi
=
µ− 1
µ
αYt
2nft
1
ρ+ gfn
≡ vft , (16)
where gfpi and g
f
n are the steady-state growth rates of pi
f
t and n
f
t respectively.
4See for example Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) and Yang (2013).
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2.6 R&D for domestic differentiated inputs
The innovation process in the sector that uses domestic inputs is
n˙dt = k
d
tR
d
t , (17)
where Rdt denotes domestic R&D labor in sector d. The productivity of R
d
t is given by
kdt = n
d
t , which captures knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1990). Free entry yields
n˙dt v
d
t = wtR
d
t ⇔ ndt vdt = wt. (18)
2.7 R&D for foreign differentiated inputs
The innovation process in the sector that uses foreign inputs is
n˙ft = k
f
t R
f
t , (19)
where Rft denotes domestic R&D labor in sector f . The productivity of R
f
t is k
f
t = n
f
t (1 +
λτ ft ), where τ
f
t = pz,t
∫ nft
0
xft (ω)dω/Yt is the value of imports (for producing differentiated
inputs) as a ratio to output. This specification is consistent with Grossman and Helpman
(1991) who also assume that knowledge spillovers arise from trade.5 Imposing symmetry and
using (7) and (15), one can show that τ ft = α/(2µ) and k
f
t = n
f
t +λn
f
t /µ where λ ≡ λα/2 and
λnft /µ captures an additional knowledge spillover effect from imports. In this case, patent
protection µ reduces knowledge spillovers because a larger markup reduces the demand for
imports. Thus, although entrepreneurs are able to appropriate foreign technologies, this
foreign knowledge spillover effect is decreasing in µ. Free entry yields
n˙ft v
f
t = wtR
f
t ⇔ (1 + λ/µ)nft vft = wt. (20)
2.8 Equilibrium labor allocation
The resource constraint on labor is
Rdt + L
d
t +R
f
t + L
f
t = l
d
t + l
f
t = l, (21)
where ldt ≡ Rdt + Ldt and lf ≡ Rft + Lft . Substituting (6), (9) and (13) into (18) yields
Ld =
1− α
α
µ
µ− 1(ρ+R
d), (22)
which together with (21) implies that steady-state equilibrium Rd is
Rd = α
(
µ− 1
µ− α
)
ld − ρµ
(
1− α
µ− α
)
, (23)
where ld is endogenous. Substituting (7), (9) and (16) into (20) yields
Lf =
1− α
α
µ
µ− 1
(
ρ
1 + λ/µ
+Rf
)
, (24)
5See Coe and Helpman (1995) for empirical evidence that trade affects international spillovers.
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which together with (21) implies that steady-state equilibrium Rf is
Rf = α
(
µ− 1
µ− α
)
lf − ρµ
1 + λ/µ
(
1− α
µ− α
)
, (25)
where lf is endogenous. To solve for ld and lf , we use (6), (7) and (9) to obtain
Lf = Ld, (26)
which together with (22) and (24) implies
lf =
ρλ
µ+ λ
+ ld. (27)
Combining (21) and (27) yields
ld(µ
+
) =
1
2
(
l − ρλ
µ+ λ
)
, (28)
lf (µ
−
) =
1
2
(
l +
ρλ
µ+ λ
)
, (29)
which show that stronger patent protection µ leads to a reallocation of labor from sector f
to sector d because µ suppresses knowledge spillovers from imports in sector f .
2.9 Equilibrium growth rates of technologies
The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of ndt is
gdn ≡
n˙dt
ndt
= Rd(µ) = α
(
µ− 1
µ− α
)
ld(µ
+
)− ρµ
(
1− α
µ− α
)
, (30)
which is increasing in µ. Intuitively, stronger patent protection increases profit, which in
turn increases R&D in sector d. Furthermore, this positive effect is strengthened by the
reallocation of resources from sector f to sector d. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 The growth rate of technology in the sector that uses domestic inputs is
increasing in patent protection µ.
Proof. Use (30).
The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of nft is
gfn ≡
n˙ft
nft
= (1 + λ/µ)Rf (µ) = (1 + λ/µ)α
(
µ− 1
µ− α
)
lf (µ
−
)− ρµ
(
1− α
µ− α
)
, (31)
which can be increasing or decreasing in patent protection µ. Intuitively, stronger patent
protection increases profit, which is a positive effect on R&D in sector f . However, stronger
patent protection also has a negative effect on knowledge spillovers and R&D in sector
5
f . Furthermore, this negative effect is strengthened by the reallocation of resources from
sector f to sector d. Therefore, the overall effect of patent protection on the growth rate of
technology in sector f is ambiguous.6 Proposition 2 summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 The growth rate of technology in the sector that uses foreign inputs can be
increasing or decreasing in patent protection µ.
Proof. Use (31).
Finally, taking the difference between the growth rates of nft and n
d
t yields
∆gn ≡ gfn − gdn = α
(
µ− 1
µ− α
)[
λ
2µ
(
l +
ρλ
µ+ λ
)
+
ρλ
µ+ λ
]
> 0. (32)
The growth rate of technology is higher in sector f than in sector d due to the additional
knowledge spillovers from imports in sector f . Furthermore, it can be shown that ∆gn is
firstly increasing and eventually decreasing in µ. If we consider ρ→ 0, then ∆gn is explicitly
an inverted-U function in µ. Proposition 3 summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 The growth rate of technology is higher in the sector that uses foreign inputs
than in the sector that uses domestic inputs. The difference ∆gn in the growth rates is firstly
increasing and eventually decreasing in patent protection µ.
Proof. Use (32).
3 Empirical model
From Wooldridge (2006), the basic form of the logit model is7
Pi = P (yi = 1|Zi) = F (Zi, β) = exp(β0 + βZi)
1 + exp(β0 + βZi)
, (33)
where Pi is the probability of firm i having an innovation. F (Zi, β) is the cumulative distri-
bution function of the logistic distribution. Manipulating (33), we obtain
ln
(
Pi
1− Pi
)
= β0 + βZi, (34)
where Zi denotes a vector of explanatory variables.
We consider IPR and imported intermediate inputs as two main explanatory variables
on innovation. To analyze how IPR affects importing firms’ innovation, we introduce an
interaction term between IPR and imports. We specify our empirical model as follows:
ln
(
Pit
1− Pit
)
= β0 + β1IPRpt + β2INTit + β3INTit ∗ IPRpt + θZit + ηp + ηj + ηt + εit (35)
6See also Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) and Saito (2017), who explore other
channels through which patent breadth has ambiguous effects on innovation.
7Our findings in Table 1 and Figure 1 are robust to the probit model. Results are available upon request.
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where ln(Pit/(1 − Pit)) is the log odds of firm i having innovation at time t and Pit =
P (NEWit = 1|Zit). NEWit denotes innovation of firm i in year t defined as whether firm
i produces new products in year t.8 If it does, then NEWit = 1; otherwise NEWit = 0.
Explanatory variables include IPRpt, INTit, INTit ∗ IPRpt and other control variables Zit.
IPRpt denotes the log level of IPR in province p of China at time t. INTit is a dummy
variable of whether firm i imports intermediate inputs in year t. If it does, then INTit = 1;
otherwise INTit = 0. ηp is the province fixed effect. ηj is the industry fixed effect. ηt is the
year fixed effect. εit is the error term.
{β1, β2, β3} respectively captures the effects of IPR on innovation, knowledge spillovers
from imports, and the interaction between IPR and imports. First, β1 captures the direct
effect of IPR on innovation, which corresponds to Proposition 1. According to Proposition
1, β1 should be positive indicating that IPR has a positive effect on innovation. Second,
β2 captures whether importing firms benefit from knowledge spillovers. If importing firms
benefit from knowledge spillovers, then β2 should be positive. Third, β3 captures the effect
of IPR on knowledge spillovers of importing firms, which corresponds to Proposition 2.
According to Proposition 2, β3 should be negative indicating that IPR hinders knowledge
spillovers from imports. Finally, Proposition 3 implies
P (NEWit = 1|INTit = 1, IPRpt) > P (NEWit = 1|INTit = 0, IPRpt); (36)
i.e., importing firms have better innovation performance than non-importing firms.
Other explanatory variables Zit include the proportion of firm exports in total output
(EXP ), foreign capital share (FOR), the log of firm age (AGE), the log of total factor
productivity (TFP ) and the log of firm size measured by employment (SIZE) that may
affect enterprise innovation. In addition, we also control for the log of per capita GDP at the
provincial level (INCOME) and the log of the Herfindal index computed from the 4-digit
Chinese Industry Classification system (HERF ).
With the entry of China to the WTO in 2001 and the requirements of the TRIPS A-
greement, the strengthening of IPR in China during that period has an exogenous nature.
Therefore, we consider data from 2000 to 2007.9 We present a description of the data and
summary statistics in an online appendix.10
4 Regression results
Table 1 shows the regression results. From columns (1) to (3), IPR contributes to innovation
at 10% significance level whereas imports INT contribute to innovation at 1% significance
level. In column (4), we include an interaction term between IPR and imports of intermediate
inputs. Two findings emerge. First, the coefficients of IPR and imports have the same
sign but become more significant compared to those in columns (1) to (3). Second, the
8We measure innovation of firms by a dummy variable of new products to correspond to the theoretical
model. From the law of large numbers, the probability of each firm having a new product corresponds to
the growth rate of products in its sector.
9We consider data up to 2007 due to the incompatibility of data in the Chinese industrial enterprises
database from 2008 onwards.
10See the Appendix.
7
interaction coefficient is negative at 5% significance level, which means that IPR has a
significant negative effect on importing firms’ innovation. These results confirm Propositions
1 and 2.
[Insert Table 1 here]
From column (4), we calculate the probability of innovation at each level of IPR. As
shown in figure 1, with the improvement of IPR, importing and non-importing firms both
experience higher innovation probability, but the innovation probability of importing firms
is higher than that of non-importing firms. However, with stronger IPR, the gap between
the two types of firms first widens and eventually narrows due to the negative effect of IPR
on knowledge spillovers from imports. These findings confirm Proposition 3.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
5 Conclusion
This study develops a small-open-economy R&D-based growth model to explore the differ-
ent effects of IPR on the innovation of importing and non-importing firms. We test and
confirm theoretical results from the model using an empirical analysis of matching samples
that combine Chinese provincial IPR data with industrial enterprises database and customs
database. Our study shows that IPR has an overall positive effect on innovation in China.
Furthermore, importing firms have better innovation performance than non-importing firms;
therefore, the government should encourage international trade.
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Table 1: Regression results
Variable NEW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IPR 2.342∗ 2.346∗ 2.805∗∗
(1.274) (1.278) (1.290)
INT 0.475∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.090) (1.159)
INT ∗ IPR −1.738∗∗
(0.779)
SIZE 0.543∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
EXP 0.136 -0.022 -0.017 -0.009
(0.166) (0.151) (0.151) (0.154)
FOR −0.248∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.141) (0.142) (0.138)
TFP 0.212∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
AGE 0.166∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
INCOME 1.769 1.268 1.764 1.672
(2.710) (2.368) (2.716) (2.664)
HERF 0.135∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant -25.914 -17.804 -25.700 -25.447
(28.033) (23.653) (28.121) (27.793)
Province fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Observations 883793 883793 883793 883793
Notes. The brackets are the standard errors clustering at the province level. Significant at
*10%, **5% and ***1%.
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Figure 1: Firm innovation probabilities based on logit model
Notes. Stata’s margins command is used to calculate the marginal effect of intellectual
property rights on innovation probability. IPR is measured in log.
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Imports and Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation
in China: Online Data Appendix
Angus C. Chu Guobing Shen Xun Zhang
September 2017
1 Intellectual property rights
Shen (2010) use the method in Ginarte and Park (1997)1 to construct an annual measure
of intellectual property rights (IPR) at the country level in China. We use his data from
2000 to 2007. As for the level of IPR in each province, we use information on the level
of administrative protection and the level of judicial protection as follows. First, we use
two indicators to measure IPR at the administrative level. (1) The importance of provincial
government’s emphasis on IPR. As in Ang et al. (2014), we use the number of articles on the
protection of IPR in the newspapers of provincial authorities divided by the total number of
articles in the newspapers of each province as a measure of this index. The higher the index,
the more emphasis on the protection of IPR by the provincial government. (2) The degree
of administrative protection of provincial patent offices. As in Wu and Tang (2006), we use
the annual number of patent disputes as a ratio to the cumulative number of patent licenses
in China Intellectual Property Rights Yearbook (2001-2008)2 to calculate the administrative
protection level of the State Intellectual Property Office in each of the 31 provinces in China
(equal to one minus the ratio of the number of annual patent disputes to the cumulative
number of patents granted). A larger value of the indicator is associated with more effective
administrative protection by the provincial patent authority.
Second, we measure the provincial intellectual property judicial protection by two indica-
tors. (1) Provincial judicial protection situation. Data on the protection of producer rights
is from Fan et al. (2011). Based on the fairness of law enforcement and the efficiency of
law enforcement agencies, this indicator measures the legal environment in each province in
different years. (2) Whether the courts take the “three-in-one” trial in intellectual property
cases. If the courts at all levels in a province have announced the “three-in-one” trial in in-
tellectual property cases in a given year, then the variable is set to 1 for the year and beyond,
otherwise 0. We consider this variable because China’s intellectual properties are protected
by both administrative protection and judicial protection. Wang and Lv (2016) consider
IPR in Guangdong province and find that the “three-in-one” trial model has a significant
role in promoting firm innovation by improving the quality and efficiency of trials in courts.
1See Papageorgiadisa and Sharma (2016) for an alternative IPR measure at the national level.
2Data in 2000 is based on the annual statistical report of the State Intellectual Property Office.
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Ginarte and Park (1997) measure IPR by taking the arithmetic average of IPR sub-
indicators to compute their aggregate index. However, the arithmetic mean may not fully
reflect the difference in the relative importance of the IPR sub-indicators. Wu and Tang
(2016) use principal component analysis to measure the enforcement of IPR in Chinese
provinces. Principal component analysis converts a number of related indicators into a
representative comprehensive indicator by dimensionality reduction. We use this method
to synthesize the national protection of IPR, the provincial administrative enforcement and
the provincial judicial protection to form our provincial IPR index. The eigenvalues of our
five principal components are 1.7702, 1.0297, 0.9325, 0.7078 and 0.5598. Given that the first
three principal components have accumulated 74.7% of the information, we construct the
IPR index of each province with the first three principal components. This IPR index at the
provincial level eliminates the overlap of information between intellectual property legislative
protection at the national level, administrative enforcement and judicial protection at the
provincial level.
2 The matching procedure of industrial enterprises database
and customs database
First, we follow Brandt et al. (2012) in cleaning up the Chinese industrial enterprises
database and constructing panel data. Second, we match Chinese industrial enterprises
panel data and customs database. We begin by matching firm name, followed by zip code
and the last seven digits of phone number, and finally zip code and legal person name.
Accordingly, we combine industrial enterprise panel data with custom information. Then,
in order to unify the import product information, we reduce product data from HS 8-digit
to HS 6-digit. Also, we unify the annual HS code to HS1996 standard according to BEC
classification to identify and calculate import information of intermediate products at the
firm level. We delete observations with missing data on total assets, employments, total
output, total assets less than the current assets, fixed assets, or accumulated depreciation
less than the depreciation of current year. We follow Brandt et al. (2012) and Kee and Tang
(2016) to exclude firms with less than 8 employees, age less than one and the total value
of imported intermediates greater than the total amount of intermediate inputs. Finally,
we match IPR data with industrial firms-customs matched panel based on the province-year
dimension. The resulting panel includes data at the firm-level from the manufacturing sector
(i.e., classification code 13 to 42 from the 2-digit Chinese Industry Classification system) in
China’s 31 provinces in year 2000-2007, except for 2004 because data on new products in
2004 is missing.
3 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
13
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NEW A dummy variable of new products 883793 0.0899 0.2861 0 1
INT A dummy variable of importing intermediate inputs 883793 0.1421 0.3492 0 1
IPR The log of intellectual property rights index-principal component analysis 883793 1.4533 0.1195 -0.9282 1.7003
IPP1 Intellectual property legislative protection 883793 4.3614 0.3291 3.4 4.53
IPP2 Administrative protection of provincial patent offices 883793 0.9987 0.0011 0.9697 1
IPP3 Provincial government’s emphasis on intellectual property protection 883793 0.0056 0.0044 0 0.0168
IPP4 The protection of producer rights from Fan et al.(2011) 883793 5.2424 2.0767 -0.46 10
IPP5 A dummy variable of “three-in-one” trial 883793 0.3388 0.4733 0 1
SIZE The log of firm size measured by employment 883793 4.8008 1.0468 2.0794 12.145
EXP The proportion of firm exports in total output 883793 0.1566 0.3300 0 1
FOR Foreign capital share 883793 0.0704 0.2376 0 1
TFP The log of total factor productivity 883793 3.7289 0.9838 -6.5247 9.728
AGE The log of firm age 883793 1.9085 0.9350 0 4.6728
INCOME The log of per capita GDP at the provincial level 883793 9.7949 0.5833 7.9165 11.0109
HERF The log of the Herfindal index 883793 -4.4808 1.1183 -6.5819 -0.1221
Notes. Sample is limited to state-owned enterprises and all other firms with sales above 5 million RMB in the manufacturing sector.
References
[1] Ang, J. S., Y. Cheng, and C. Wu, 2014. Does enforcement of intellectual property right-
s matter in China? Evidence from financing and investment choices in the high-tech
industry. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96, 332-348.
[2] Brandt, L., J. Van Biesebroeck, and Y. Zhang, 2012. Creative accounting or creative
destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing. Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 97, 339-351.
[3] Fan, G., X. Wang, and H. Zhu, 2011. NERI INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces
2011 Report. (Chinese) Economic Science Press.
[4] Ginarte, J. C., and W. G. Park, 1997. Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national
study. Research Policy, 26, 283-301.
[5] Kee, H. L., and H. Tang, 2016. Domestic value added in exports: theory and firm evidence
from China. American Economic Review, 106, 1402-1436.
[6] Papageorgiadisa, N., and A. Sharma, 2016. Intellectual property rights and innovation:
A panel analysis. Economics Letters, 141, 70-72.
[7] Shen, G., 2010. Nominal level and actual strength of China’s intellectual property protec-
tion under TRIPS agreement. Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies,
3, 71-88.
[8] Wang, H., and T. Lv, 2016. Judicial protection of intellectual property and enterprise
innovation: Quasi-nature experiment based on Guangdong province intellectual property
case. (Chinese) Management World, 10, 118-133.
[9] Wu, C., and D. Tang, 2016. Intellectual property rights enforcement, corporate innovation
and operating performance: Evidence from China’s listed companies. (Chinese) Economic
Research Journal, 11, 125-139.
14
